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Abstract
Philip Reny's approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original
context. The existence of Nash equilibrium and the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with
a nite number of individual improvements are established, under conditions weaker than the better
reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic comple-
ments, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions. MSC2010 Classication:
91A10; JEL Classication: C 72.
Key words: discontinuous game; potential game; Bertrand competition; strategic complements;
aggregative game.
1 Introduction
Reny (1999) made a signicant step in the development of sucient conditions for Nash equilibrium
existence in games with discontinuous utility functions. A feature common to games considered by
Reny and most of his followers, see, e.g., McLennan et al. (2011) or Prokopovych (2013), is that the
strategy sets are convex and each utility function is quasiconcave in own argument. Bich (2009) relaxes
the quasiconcavity, but not at all radically.
In this paper, we extend Reny's approach to three dierent classes of strategic games: potential
games; games with strategic complements; aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity condi-
tions. Besides, our attention is switched from the mere existence of a Nash equilibrium to the possibility
to approach the equilibrium set with a nite \individual improvement path." What unites the three
classes is that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in none of them has anything to do with convexity.
Moreover, it is much easier to prove and understand in the case of a nite game; in an innite game,
there may be no equilibrium at all, to say nothing of its approachability, without some topological
assumptions. And for each class of games, we obtain a set of such assumptions that could not be
derived from the previous literature.
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Following Reny (2016), we consider games with purely ordinal preferences, i.e., where utility func-
tions take values from arbitrary chains rather than the real line. Inevitably, we only consider pure
strategies. Our (i.e., essentially, Reny's) topological assumptions do not ensure the existence of the
best responses; therefore, the standard xed point theorems cannot be applied directly. Instead, we
consider nite subgames, where Nash equilibria not only exist, but can be reached, starting from an
arbitrary strategy prole, with a nite number of individual improvements. The \nite deviation" as-
sumptions ensure the possibility to nd a nite subgame every Nash equilibrium of which is arbitrarily
close to the set of Nash equilibria of the original game. Thus, we obtain the \very weak nite improve-
ment" property of the original game: the set of Nash equilibria is nonempty and can be approached
with a nite number of individual improvements starting anywhere in the set of strategy proles.
We understand potential games in a much broader sense than Monderer and Shapley (1996), viz.
we consider games where individual improvements are acyclic. Thus, our Theorem 1 generalizes the
main result of Kukushkin (2011), which in its turn generalized the good old \acyclicity plus open
lower contour sets" theorem (Bergstrom, 1975; Walker, 1977). As an application to economics, we
show that the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold in a rather general class of Bertrand competition games
(Propositions 4.1 and 4.2).
Strategic complements are also understood in a more general, ordinal sense, as in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994), rather than in the cardinal one, as in Vives (1990). Moreover, we do not x a list
of requirements a game must satisfy to deserve the badge of \Strategic Complements." The point
is that there are various versions of the single crossing and quasisupermodularity conditions in the
literature (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992; Shannon, 1995; Quah, 2007; Quah
and Strulovici, 2009; Kukushkin, 2013b) and \trade-os" between them are possible, i.e., a stronger
interpretation of one property coupled with a weaker interpretation of the other may have the same
implications as a weaker interpretation of the rst property together with a stronger interpretation of
the second. Our Theorems 2 and 20 extend the main result of Kukushkin et al. (2005) to innite games,
even with some strengthening.
While the only known way to establish the existence of an equilibrium in a potential game of
Section 4 or an aggregative game of Section 6 consists in following improvement paths, in the case of
strategic complements there is also an option of invoking Tarski's xed point theorem, which ensures
equilibrium existence without giving much information on better response dynamics (e.g., Theorem 5.1
of Vives (1990) establishes the convergence of Cournot ta^tonnement to equilibrium only if the starting
point belongs to a rather specic area in the set of strategy proles). The fact that the mere existence
of an equilibrium can be obtained under weaker assumptions than in our Theorem 2 may be of interest
to some readers. (An anonymous referee even refused to see any value in studying improvement
dynamics when the existence of an equilibrium can be established by other means.) Accordingly, a list
of such assumptions is given in Proposition 5.1. A comparison with an earlier result on the existence
of Nash equilibrium in a discontinuous game with a version of strategic complements, Theorem 2 of
Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017), is in Section 7.5.
In contrast to strategic complements, strategic substitutes, by themselves, are not conducive to
the existence of Nash equilibrium. In a game with additive aggregation, however, they do ensure the
existence of an equilibrium as was shown by Novshek (1985), see also Kukushkin (1994). Dubey et al.
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(2006), having modied a construction invented by Huang (2002) for dierent purposes, created a tool
applicable to some non-additive aggregation rules as well. Kukushkin (2005) used the tool to show the
convergence of Cournot ta^tonnement to equilibrium in aggregative games exhibiting strategic comple-
ments, strategic substitutes, or a combination of both. The most general description of aggregation
rules for which that trick can still work was given by Jensen (2010). Our Theorem 3 establishes the
existence and approachability of Nash equilibrium in games with Jensen aggregation rules where the
best responses may fail to exist.
Section 2 contains basic denitions and notations associated with a strategic game. In Section 3,
we reproduce Reny's original notions and more general topological conditions, which, via a technical
Proposition 3.4, play the key role in the rest of the paper. In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we consecutively
apply Proposition 3.4 to potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games.
Several related questions of secondary importance are discussed in Section 7. More complicated (or
just tedious) proofs (of Proposition 3.2, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, Proposition 5.1, Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3) are deferred to Appendix.
2 Basic denitions
A strategic game   is dened by a nite set of players N and, for each i 2 N , a strategy set Xi, a
chain Ci (a utility scale), and a \generalized" utility function ui : XN ! Ci, where XN :=
Q
i2N Xi is
the set of strategy proles. For each i 2 N , we denote X i :=
Q
j2NnfigXj , and often use notation like
(xi; x i) 2 XN .
With every strategic game, we associate this individual improvement relation BInd on XN (i 2 N ,
yN ; xN 2 XN ):
yN BIndi xN 
 [y i = x i & ui(yN ) > ui(xN )];
yN BInd xN 
 9i 2 N [yN BIndi xN ]:
By denition, a Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of the relation BInd on XN , i.e., a strategy prole
xN 2 XN such that yN BInd xN holds for no yN 2 XN . The set of Nash equilibria is denoted E( )  XN .
An (individual) improvement path is a (nite or innite) sequence hxkN ik=0;1;::: such that xk+1N BInd
xkN whenever k  0 and xk+1N is dened. A strategic game   has the nite improvement property
(FIP, Monderer and Shapley, 1996) i there is no innite improvement path.   has the weak nite
improvement property (weak FIP) i, for every strategy prole x0N 2 XN , there is a nite improvement
path x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such that x
m
N 2 E( ). Obviously, FIP implies weak FIP: every improvement path in
a game with FIP ends at a Nash equilibrium after a nite number of steps. Both properties look more
natural for a nite game although they may be observed in an innite game now and then.
Henceforth, the strategy sets Xi are assumed to be topological spaces; each chain Ci is endowed
with its order interval topology; the sets XN , CN :=
Q
i2N Ci, X i, and XNCN are endowed with their
product topologies. The topological closure of a subset Y of any one of those spaces is denoted clY . We
say that   has the very weak FIP (Kukushkin, 2011) i, for every x0N 2 XN , there is yN 2 E( ) such
that for every open neighborhood O of yN there is a nite improvement path x
0
N ; : : : ; x
m
N with x
m
N 2 O.
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Slightly relaxing the requirement, we say that   has the very-very weak FIP i, for every x0N 2 XN ,
there is yN 2 cl E( ) such that for every open neighborhood O of yN there is a nite improvement path
x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N with x
m
N 2 O.
Remark. If XN is a metric space with a metric d, then the very-very weak FIP can be reformulated
as follows: for every x0N 2 XN and every " > 0, there are yN 2 E( ) and a nite improvement path
x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such that d(yN ; x
m
N ) < ". In this case, the dierence between the very weak FIP and the
very-very weak FIP is whether the same yN 2 E( ) can be chosen for all " > 0 or not.
Proposition 2.1. A strategic game   has the very weak FIP if and only if, for every x0N 2 XN and
every open neighborhood O of E( ), there is a nite improvement path x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such that x
m
N 2 O.
Proof. The necessity is obvious: every open neighborhood of E( ) is simultaneously an open neigh-
borhood of yN 2 E( ) from the denition of the very weak FIP. To prove the suciency, we suppose
the contrary: for every yN 2 E( ), there is an open neighborhood O(yN ) 3 yN such that no nite
improvement path started at x0N ever reaches O(yN ). Then we set O :=
S
yN2E( )O(yN ); in the case
of E( ) = ;, O := ;. Now O is an open neighborhood of E( ); therefore, there must be a nite
improvement path x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such that x
m
N 2 O. If E( ) = ;, we have xmN 2 ;; otherwise, there holds
xmN 2 O(yN ) for some yN 2 E( ). In either case, we have a contradiction.
Proposition 2.2. A strategic game   has the very-very weak FIP if and only if, for every x0N 2 XN
and every open neighborhood O of cl E( ), there is a nite improvement path x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such that
xmN 2 O.
The proof is essentially the same as that of Proposition 2.1; only E( ) should be replaced with
cl E( ).
3 Better-reply security and nite deviation
We start with auxiliary notations. Considering functions ui as components of a mapping uN : XN !
CN , we denote G the graph of the mapping, i.e., the set of pairs hxN ; uN (xN )i 2 XN  CN for all
xN 2 XN . For every xN 2 XN , we denote G(xN ) := fvN 2 CN j (xN ; vN ) 2 clGg and perceive G as a
correspondence from XN to CN .
Then, we reproduce Reny's (1999) denitions. Player i 2 N can secure a payo of  2 Ci at
xN 2 XN i there exists yi 2 Xi such that ui(yi; x i)   for all x i in some open neighborhood of
x i. A game   is better-reply secure i, whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium and vN 2 G(xN ), some
player i can secure a payo strictly above vi at xN .
Let Y  XN be a set of strategy proles and Z be a set of pairs hi; yii (i 2 N , yi 2 Xi). We say
that Z dominates Y i for every xN 2 Y there holds ui(yi; x i) > ui(xN ), i.e., (yi; x i) BInd xN , for
(at least one) hi; yii 2 Z. When Z is nite, we say that Y is nitely dominated (with Z).
A game   has the R-nite deviation property i, for every xN 2 XN n E( ), there is an open
neighborhood of xN which is nitely dominated.   has the P-nite deviation property i, for every
xN 2 XN n E( ), there is an open neighborhood O of xN such that O n E( ) is nitely dominated.  
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has the Q-nite deviation property i, for every xN 2 XN n cl E( ), there is an open neighborhood of
xN which is nitely dominated.
Y  XN is singly dominated i it is dominated with a set Z containing at most one pair hi; yii for
each i 2 N . A game   has the R-single deviation property [Q-single deviation property ] i, for every
xN 2 XN n E( ) [xN 2 XN n cl E( )], there is an open neighborhood of xN which is singly dominated.
  has the P-single deviations property i, for every xN 2 XN nE( ), there is an open neighborhood O
of xN such that O n E( ) is singly dominated.
R-single (nite) deviation properties were introduced by Reny (2011), under the names of just single
(nite) deviation properties. P-single deviation property was introduced by Prokopovych (2013), under
the name of weak single deviation property. The other denitions are given here by analogy, for the
completeness of the picture. This set of implications is obvious:
R-single deviation ) P-single deviation ) Q-single deviation
+ + +
R-nite deviation ) P-nite deviation ) Q-nite deviation.
Example 3.1. Let us consider a strategic game   where N := f1; 2g; X1 := f0; 1; 2g; X2 := f0g [
f1=hgh=1;2;:::  R; u1(0; x2) := 0 for all x2;
u1(1; x2) :=
(
3; x2 = 0 or x2 = 1=(2h+ 1);
 3; x2 = 1=(2h);
u1(2; x2) :=
(
3; x2 = 0 or x2 = 1=(2h);
 3; x2 = 1=(2h+ 1);
u2(x1; x2) :=  x1  x2 for all x1; x2.
Clearly, E( ) = f(1; 0); (2; 0)g.   even has the FIP since x2 can only decrease along any improve-
ment path. The game has the R-nite deviation property, but not even Q-single deviation property:
both x1 = 1 and x1 = 2 are necessary to dominate any open neighborhood of (0; 0).
A one-person game with the P-single deviation property, but without the R-nite deviation property
is easy to produce. Example 4.2 presents a game with the Q-single deviation property, but without
the P-nite deviation property.
Proposition 3.1. If a game   has the R-nite deviation property, then E( ) is closed.
A straightforward proof is omitted. Note that E( ) may be empty. Obviously, R-nite deviation
cannot be replaced with P-single deviation.
Proposition 3.2. If a game   is better-reply secure and cluN (XN ) is compact, then   has the R-single
deviation property.
The statement is rather close to Reny (2011, Theorem 1) and Prokopovych (2013, Lemma 2), and
implies both. Since our assumptions are broader, a complete proof is given in Appendix, Section A.
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Proposition 3.3. If a game   has the Q-nite deviation property, and Y  (XN ncl E( )) is compact,
then Y is nitely dominated. If a game   has the P-nite deviation property, and Y  (XN nE( )) is
compact, then Y is nitely dominated.
Proof. Both statements are proven with essentially the same argument. By our assumption, there is an
open neighborhood O(xN ) of every xN 2 Y which is nitely dominated, or such that O(xN ) n E( ) is
nitely dominated. Since Y is compact, it is covered by a nite number of those open neighborhoods.
Taking the union of the appropriate sets of pairs hi; yii, we see that Y is nitely dominated indeed.
To formulate our main technical result, we need a few denitions more.
A subgame  0 of   is a strategic game dened by subsets X 0i  Xi for all i 2 N and the restriction
of the utility mapping uN to X
0
N :=
Q
i2N X
0
i; we will use the notation  
0   . The individual
improvement relation in a subgame is the restriction ofBInd toX 0N . If xN 2 E( )\X 0N , then xN 2 E( 0);
if xN 2 E( 0), it need not belong to E( ).   has the quasi weak FIP i, for every nite subgame  0 of
 , there is  00 such that  0   00    and  00 has the weak FIP.
Proposition 3.4. Let a game   have the quasi weak FIP, and let XN be compact. If   has the P-nite
deviation property, then it has the very weak FIP. If   has the Q-nite deviation property, then it has
the very-very weak FIP.
Proof. As in the case of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, the proofs of both assertions are essentially the same;
only E( ) should be replaced with cl E( ) in the second case. We consider the rst statement and
apply the criterion established in Proposition 2.1.
Let O  E( ) be open and let x0N 2 XN n O. Since XN n O is compact, it is nitely dominated
by Proposition 3.3. Let Z be an appropriate nite set of pairs. For each i 2 N , we dene X 0i :=
fx0i g [ fyi j hi; yii 2 Zg  Xi. The sets X 0i dene a nite subgame  0 of  ; by our assumption, there
is  00 such that  0   00    and  00 has the weak FIP. Therefore, there is a nite improvement path
x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N in  
00 such that xmN 2 E( 00). Now, we have either xmN 2 O or xmN =2 O. In the rst case, we
are home because x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N remains a nite improvement path in  . In the second case, we would
have xmN 2 XN n O  XN n cl E( ) and hence there would be hi; yii 2 Z such that (yi; xm i) BIndi xmN ,
which is incompatible with xmN 2 E( 00) since yi 2 X 0i  X 00i .
Since O  E( ) and x0N 2 XN were arbitrary, Proposition 2.1 is applicable indeed and we are
home.
4 Potential games
The relation BInd is acyclic i there is no nite improvement cycle, i.e., no improvement path for which
x0N = x
m
N with m > 0. A sucient condition for that is the existence of a generalized ordinal potential
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996), i.e., a function P : XN ! R such that P (yN ) > P (xN ) whenever
yN BInd xN . (For a nite game, that condition is also necessary.)
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Theorem 1. Let   be a strategic game with compact strategy sets Xi. Let the individual improvement
relation BInd in   be acyclic. If   has the P-nite deviation property, then it has the very weak FIP.
If   has the Q-nite deviation property, then it has the very-very weak FIP.
Proof. Let  0 be a nite subgame of  . Since BInd is acyclic in  , and hence in  0 as well,  0 even has
the FIP. Therefore,   has the quasi weak FIP and hence Proposition 3.4 is applicable.
The assumptions of Theorem 1 are satised in Examples 4, 5, and 6 of Prokopovych and Yannelis
(2017). The rst two games even have the weak FIP: no more than two individual improvements are
needed to reach a Nash equilibrium from every strategy prole. Example 6 actually belongs to a rather
general class of games covered by Theorem 1.
We dene a simple Bertrand competition game (with linear production costs and without biting
capacity constraints) as follows. There is a nite set N of rms capable of producing a homogenous
good. Each rm i 2 N is characterized by its constant marginal cost of production ci  0; its
strategy is a price xi 2 [ci;Ki] (dumping is forbidden). When all prices are announced, consumers
buy at the cheapest. The total demand is given by an upper semicontinuous and decreasing function
D : R+ ! R+. To avoid pathologies, we assume that #N > 1, maxi ci < miniKi andD(p) > 0 for some
p > maxi ci. The rms which announced the lowest price share the total demand equally; the rms
which announced higher prices produce nothing and sell nothing. DenotingM(xN ) := Argmini xi  N ,
the utility functions are
ui(xN ) :=
(
(xi   ci) D(xi)=#M(xN ); i 2M(xN );
0; i =2M(xN ):
Proposition 4.1. The individual improvement relation BInd is acyclic in every simple Bertrand com-
petition game  . If #Argmini2N ci > 1, then   has the R-single deviation property and hence satises
the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 is, thus, applicable whenever all rms have the same marginal cost of production. When
a single rm is the most ecient producer, i.e., Argminj2N cj = fig, the exact shape of the demand
function D (to be more precise, what price(s) would be optimal for player i as a monopolist) starts to
matter. Denoting c := minj 6=i cj [> ci] in this case, we formulate ve similar, but distinct, conditions:
Argmax
xi2[ci;c]
 
(xi   ci) D(xi)
  [ci; c[; (1a)
9c > c Argmax
xi2[ci;c]
 
(xi   ci) D(xi)
  [ci; c] ; (1b)
9c > c  [ci; c] \Argmax
xi2[ci;c]
 
(xi   ci) D(xi)
 6= ; ; (1c)
8c < c  [c; c[ \Argmax
xi2[ci;c]
 
(xi   ci) D(xi)
 6= ; ; (1d)
[ci; c[ \Argmax
xi2[ci;c]
 
(xi   ci) D(xi)
 6= ;: (1e)
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These implications hold: (1a) ) (1b) ) (1c) and (1a) ) (1e) ( (1d); the rst follows from the
upper semicontinuity of D; the others are obvious. All other implications between conditions (1) are,
generally, wrong.
Proposition 4.2. Let   be a simple Bertrand competition game such that Argminj2N cj = fig. Then:
4.2.1. Condition (1a) is sucient for   to have the R-single deviation property and necessary for   to
have the R-nite deviation property.
4.2.2. The conjunction of conditions (1b) and (1e) is sucient for   to have the P-single deviation
property and necessary for   to have the P-nite deviation property.
4.2.3. The disjunction of conditions (1c) and (1d) is sucient for   to have the Q-single deviation
property and necessary for   to have the Q-nite deviation property.
4.2.4. Condition (1e) is necessary and sucient for   to have the very weak FIP property.
4.2.5. The disjunction of all conditions (1) is sucient for   to have the very-very weak FIP property
and necessary for   to possess a Nash equilibrium.
Intertwined proofs of both Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 are deferred to Appendix, Section B.
A simple Bertrand competition game may possess a Nash equilibrium without satisfying the assump-
tions of Theorem 1. However, this situation is inherently unstable: an arbitrarily small perturbation
of coecients cj makes the theorem applicable.
Proposition 4.3. Whenever a simple Bertrand competition game   possesses a Nash equilibrium, but
does not satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1, there is a player j 2 N such that for every " > 0
there is c0j 2 [cj   "; cj ] such that the simple Bertrand competition game  0 where cj is replaced with
c0j while everything else remains the same has the R-single deviation property and hence satises the
assumptions of Theorem 1.
Proof. Our assumption implies that Argminj2N cj = fig, (1e) holds, and all other conditions (1) do not.
Thus, there is x+i 2 [ci; c[ such that (x+i  ci)D(x+i ) = (c ci)D(c) = maxxi2[ci;c]
 
(xi ci)D(xi)

. The
negation of (1d) implies the existence of c 2 [ci; c[ such that (x+i   ci) D(x+i ) > (xi  ci) D(xi) for all
xi 2 [c; c[; clearly, x+i < c. We pick j 2 N for which cj = c. Given " > 0, we set c0j := maxfc; cj "g.
In the modied game  0, we have c0 = c0j . Thus, (x
+
i   ci) D(x+i ) > (c0   ci) D(c0), i.e., (1a) holds in
 0.
Example 4.1. Let us consider a simple Bertrand competition game   where N := f1; 2g; c1 := 0;
c2 := 2; K1 := K2 := 10;
D(p) :=
8><>:
2; 0  p  1;
1; 1 < p  3;
0; 3 < p:
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The demand is formed by two big buyers; each is willing to buy just one unit of the good; the highest
acceptable price is 1 for one buyer and 3 for the other. Let us denote V (p) := pD(p) the prot of
player 1 as a monopolist. Clearly, Argmaxp2[0;2] V (p) = f1; 2g, while Argmaxp2[0;c+] V (p) = fc+g for
every c+ > 2 = c. Clearly, E( ) = f(1; 2)g. Of all conditions (1), only (1e) holds, so Theorem 1 is not
applicable. By Proposition 4.2,   has the very weak FIP property.
If, everything else remaining the same, c2 is greater than 2, then condition (1e) no longer holds and
the Nash equilibrium disappears. If c2 is slightly less than 2, then, in accordance with Proposition 4.3,
even (1a) holds and E( ) becomes fxN 2 XN j x1 = 1; x2  2g.
Example 4.2. Let us consider a simple Bertrand competition game   where N := f1; 2g; c1 := 0;
c2 := 1; K1 := K2 := 10; D(p) := maxf(3   p)=(1 + p); 0g. Again denoting, for p < 3, V (p) :=
(3  p)p=(1 + p) = 4p=(1 + p)  p, prot of player 1 as a monopolist, we have V 0(p) = 4=(1 + p)2   1;
therefore, V 0(p) > 0 for p < 1 and V 0(p) < 0 for p > 1. Of all conditions (1), only (1b) and (1c)
hold. By Proposition 4.2,   has the Q-single deviation property, but not even the P-nite deviation
property. Actually, the best response of player 1 is x1 = 1 when x2 > 1, and does not exist when
x2 = 1; therefore, E( ) = fxN 2 XN j x1 = 1; x2 > 1g.
It is instructive to ascertain that   does not have the very weak FIP property, only the very-very
weak FIP. Let us consider a strategy prole xN = (x1; 1) with x1 < 1. Player 2 cannot improve at all;
player 1 can improve choosing y1 2 ]x1; 1[. Repeating such improvements, player 1 can, at most, realize
an innite improvement path converging to x!N := (1; 1). Since x
!
N belongs to cl E( ), but not to E( ),
we see that there is no very weak FIP indeed. An interesting point is that an \innite improvement
cycle" is possible in   (where all improvements are done by player 1). Choosing x!N as a starting prole,
we inevitably move to (x1; 1) with x1 < 1 at the rst step, and then can return back to x
!
N in the limit.
If, everything else remaining the same, c2 is greater than 1, then condition (1a) holds; hence the
R-single deviation property obtains and E( ) becomes fxN 2 XN j x1 = 1g. If c2 is slightly less than
1, then all conditions (1) are broken and all Nash equilibria disappear.
5 Strategic complements
We start with standard denitions useful for monotone comparative statics.
LetX and S be partially ordered sets (posets) and C be a chain. We say that a function u : XS ! C
satises the single crossing conditions (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) i, for all x; y 2 X and s; s0 2 S,
there holds
[y > x & s0 > s & u(y; s) > u(x; s)]) u(y; s0) > u(x; s0); (2a)
[y < x & s0 < s & u(y; s) > u(x; s)]) u(y; s0) > u(x; s0): (2b)
u satises the weak single crossing condition (Shannon, 1995) i
[y > x & s0 > s & u(y; s) > u(x; s)]) u(y; s0)  u(x; s0) (3)
for all x; y 2 X and s; s0 2 S. Either condition (2) implies (3).
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Let X be a lattice. A function u : X ! C is quasisupermodular (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994;
LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992) i, whenever y; x 2 X,
u(x) > u(y ^ x)) u(y _ x) > u(y); (4a)
u(x) > u(y _ x)) u(y ^ x) > u(y): (4b)
When X is a chain, both conditions (4) are satised in a trivial way for every function u. Kukushkin
(2013b) partitioned conditions (4) into four independent conditions, two of which will be used here:
u(x) > u(y ^ x)) u(y _ x) > minfu(x); u(y)g; (5a)
u(x) > u(y _ x)) u(y ^ x) > minfu(x); u(y)g: (5b)
A function u : X ! C is weakly quasisupermodular (Shannon, 1995; LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992) i, for
all x; y 2 X,
u(x) > u(y ^ x)) u(y _ x)  minfu(x); u(y)g; (6a)
u(x) > u(y _ x)) u(y ^ x)  minfu(x); u(y)g: (6b)
These implications are obvious: (4a) ) (5a) ) (6a); (4b) ) (5b) ) (6b). Meanwhile, (4a) does not
imply (6b), and (4b) does not imply (6a).
Theorem 2. Let   be a strategic game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously a compact
topological space and a distributive lattice. Let each utility function ui satisfy the condition (2a) with
X := Xi, S := X i, and C := Ci. Let every function ui(; x i) : Xi ! Ci (i 2 N , x i 2 X i) satisfy the
condition (5a). If   has the P-nite deviation property, then it has the very weak FIP. If   has the
Q-nite deviation property, then it has the very-very weak FIP.
Essentially, this theorem follows from Proposition 3.4 above and Theorem 1 of Kukushkin et al.
(2005). Since the assumptions of the latter theorem were somewhat stronger than those made here, a
complete proof is given in Appendix, Section C.
Theorem 20. Let   be a strategic game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously a compact
topological space and a distributive lattice. Let each utility function ui satisfy the condition (2b) with
X := Xi, S := X i, and C := Ci. Let every function ui(; x i) : Xi ! Ci (i 2 N , x i 2 X i) satisfy the
condition (5b). If   has the P-nite deviation property, then it has the very weak FIP. If   has the
Q-nite deviation property, then it has the very-very weak FIP.
The proof is dual to that of Theorem 2.
To formulate a weaker set of assumptions that ensure the mere existence of a Nash equilibrium, we
reproduce a denition from Kukushkin (2013b). Given a game   and i 2 N , amonotone pseudopartition
of X i consists of two subsets X
"
 i; X
#
 i  X i such that, whenever x00 i > x0 i, there holds either
x00 i 2 X# i or x0 i 2 X" i. Clearly, any two proles from X i n (X" i [X# i) must be incomparable in
the order on X i.
10
Proposition 5.1. Let   be a strategic game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously a compact
topological space and a distributive lattice. Let   have the Q-nite deviation property. Let the set of
players N be partitioned into two subsets, N = N1 [ N2 in such a way that each utility function ui
for i 2 N1 satises the single crossing condition (2) with X := Xi, S := X i, and C := Ci, while each
utility function ui for i 2 N2 satises the weak single crossing condition (3) with the same X, S, and
C. Let, for each i 2 N1, there be a monotone pseudopartition of X i such that ui(; x i) satises (6a)
for all xi; yi 2 Xi and x i 2 X" i, while satisfying (6b) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and x i 2 X# i. Let, for each
i 2 N2, there be a monotone pseudopartition of X i such that ui(; x i) satises (5a) for all xi; yi 2 Xi
and x i 2 X" i, while satisfying (5b) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and x i 2 X# i. Then   possesses a Nash
equilibrium.
The proof is deferred to Appendix, Section D.
Example 5.1. Let us consider a strategic game   where N := f1; 2; 3g, Xi := f0; 1g  R (with the
natural order) for each i 2 N , and the utilities are dened by the following matrices (player 1 chooses
rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices; the axes are directed from left to right and from bottom
to top): 
(1; 0; 1) (0; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 1) (1; 1; 0)
 
(1; 1; 0) (1; 1; 1)
(0; 1; 1) (1; 0; 1)

:
Conditions (2) and (4) hold everywhere (the latter, trivially). There are two Nash equilibria: the
leftmost bottom and the rightmost top. However, no improvement path started anywhere else ever
reaches either of them. In other words, the assumptions imposed in Proposition 5.1 on i 2 N1 do not
ensure the (very) weak FIP.
Example 5.2. Let us consider a strategic game   where N := f1; 2g, X1 := X2 := f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0);
(1; 1)g  R2, X2 := f0; 1g  R (both with the natural order), and the utilities are dened by the
following matrices (player 1 chooses a position within a matrix, player 2 matrix itself; the axes are
directed from left to right and from bottom to top):
(0; 2) (0; 1)
(0; 1) (2; 0)
 
(1; 0) (2; 2)
(0; 0) (1; 0)


(1; 0) (0; 0)
(2; 2) (1; 0)
 
(2; 0) (0; 1)
(0; 1) (0; 2)

:
Conditions (3) and (6a) hold everywhere. There are two Nash equilibria: the leftmost bottom and the
rightmost top. However, no improvement path started from the leftmost top or the rightmost bottom
ever reaches either of them. In other words, the assumptions imposed in Proposition 5.1 on i 2 N2 do
not ensure the (very) weak FIP.
Example 5.3. Let us consider a strategic game   whereN := f1; 2g,X1 := f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0); (1; 1)g 
R2, X2 := f0; 1g  R (both with the natural order), and the utilities are dened by the following ma-
trices (player 1 chooses a position within a matrix, player 2 matrix itself; the axes are directed from
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left to right and from bottom to top):
(0; 1) (0; 0)
(0; 1) (1; 0)
 
(1; 0) (0; 1)
(0; 0) (0; 1)

:
The utility function of player 1 satises (3) and (6) everywhere. The utility function of player 2 satises
(2) and, trivially, (4). However, there is no Nash equilibrium. In other words, combining weak versions
of both single crossing and quasisupermodularity, we do not obtain even the mere existence of an
equilibrium.
6 Aggregative games
We call a strategic game aggregative i there are mappings i : X i ! R (i 2 N), aggregation rules,
and Ui : i(X i)Xi ! Ci (i 2 N) such that
ui(xN ) = Ui(i(x i); xi) (7)
for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN . For each i 2 N , we denote Si := i(X i)  R. An aggregative game is
J-aggregative i each strategy set Xi is a poset, while there are mappings g : XN ! R, Fi : SiXi ! R
and vi : X i ! R (i 2 N) satisfying the following conditions.
First, for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN ,
g(xN ) = Fi(i(x i); xi) + vi(x i): (8)
Second, each Fi has the strictly increasing dierences property (Topkis, 1978):
8si; s0i 2 Si 8yi; xi 2 Xi

[yi > xi & s
0
i > si]) Fi(s0i; yi)  Fi(s0i; xi) > Fi(si; yi)  Fi(si; xi)

: (9)
The intuition behind condition (8) can be explained as follows. Since the utility of each player i only
depends on i(x i), we may assume that she only observes the aggregate, without knowing who chose
what. Then (8) implies that she knows g(xN ) up to an additive term, which is beyond her inuence
anyway. It seems impossible to explain why (9) is needed without studying the proof of Theorem 3 in
detail.
Remark. Jensen (2010) called a game satisfying conditions (7) and (8) \generalized quasi-aggregative";
a motivation for this terminology is given in Footnote 4 on p. 48 of that paper, see also the paragraph
following Denition 2 on p. 49.
Example 6.1. Let Xi  R and i(x i) :=
P
j 6=i ijxj , where ij 2 R and ij = ji for all i 6= j. Then
g(xN ) := (1=2)
P
i6=j ijxixj , Fi(si; xi) := sixi, and vi(x i) := (1=2)
P
k 6=i6=j kjxkxj satisfy both (8)
and (9).
Jensen (2010) provides a number of other examples.
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Theorem 3. Let   be a J-aggregative game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously a compact
topological space and a distributive lattice. Let the set of players N be partitioned into two subsets,
N = N1 [N2 in such a way that each function Ui for i 2 N1 satises the single crossing condition (2)
with X := Xi, S := Si, and C := Ci, while each function Ui for i 2 N2 satises the weak single crossing
condition (3) with the same X, S, and C. Let, for each i 2 N1, there be si 2 Si such that Ui(si; )
satises (6a) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si < si , while satisfying (6b) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si > si . Let,
for each i 2 N2, there be si 2 Si such that Ui(si; ) satises (5a) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si < si , while
satisfying (5b) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si > si . If   has the P-nite deviation property, then it has the
very weak FIP. If   has the Q-nite deviation property, then it has the very-very weak FIP.
The proof, based on Proposition 3.4 and a combination of ideas from Jensen (2010) and Kukushkin
(2016), is deferred to Appendix, Section E.
Since no monotonicity assumptions were imposed on i's, the same conditions (2), (3), (5), and
(6) have a dierent, more general meaning here than in Section 5. For instance, the signs of ij 's
in Example 6.1 may be arbitrary, so such a game may exhibit strategic complements, or strategic
substitutes, or a combination of both (\strategic supplements"). In particular, if ij =  1 for all i 6= j
in Example 6.1, we obtain a game with strategic substitutes and additive aggregation, and hence our
Theorem 3 immediately implies Theorem 3 of Novshek (1985).
Even in the case of strategic complements, i.e., when all i's are increasing, Theorem 3 adds
something to the results of Section 5, giving the assertion of Theorem 2 under the assumptions of
Proposition 5.1. Note that the games in Examples 5.1 and 5.2 are not aggregative, whereas that of
Example 5.3 is.
7 Concluding remarks
7.1. The description of the preferences of the players with \generalized" utility functions is equivalent
to the description with complete binary relations as in Reny (2016). An even more general description
would emerge if each Ci were just a poset. Theorem 1 would remain valid in this case with the same
proof, cf. Kukushkin (2011, Section 4.5). Whether Theorems 2 and 3 allow such a broad generalization
is not clear at the moment; most likely, additional assumptions would be needed.
7.2. The compactness assumption in Proposition 3.2 cannot simply be dropped. If each Ci is just
R, it boils down to the condition that each ui is bounded, both above and below. The fact that
the proposition may become wrong without an upper bound on utilities may be demonstrated with a
one-person game. As to the lower bound, two players are needed, but one of them may be a dummy.
Example 7.1. Let us consider a game where N := f1; 2g, X1 := [0; 1], X2 := f0g, and the utility
mapping is this:
uN (xN ) :=
(
(1  x1; 1=x1); if x1 > 0;
(0; 0); if x1 = 0:
The game is better-reply secure since the graph G of the utility mapping uN is closed and a payo
strictly above u1(xN ) is secured by any y1 2]0; 1[ if x1 = 0, or by any y1 2]0; x1[ if x1 > 0. Thus, all
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assumptions of Proposition 3.2 are satised except that u2 is not bounded below. On the other hand,
no open neighborhood of (0; 0) is nitely dominated; moreover, there is no Nash equilibrium.
As suggested by Reny (1999) himself, the proposition can be made applicable to unbounded utilities
via a re-interpretation of better-reply security. Namely, we could perceive uN as a mapping XN ! RN ,
where R := f 1g[R[f+1g, and require the inequality in the denition to hold for vectors in G(xN )
with innite coordinates as well. (It should be noted that R is compact in its order interval topology.)
In Example 7.1, G will no longer be closed under this interpretation, G(0; 0) = f(0; 0); (1; 1)g, and
player 1 cannot secure any payo above 1. In other words, another assumption will fail and there will
be no surprise in the absence of an equilibrium.
One could suspect the compactness assumption to imply that the preferences can actually be
described with a real-valued utility function. However, this is not the case: if, e.g., Ci is Rf0; 1g with
the lexicographic order, then the closure of every bounded subset of Ci is compact, but its embedding
into the real line may be impossible (Wakker, 1988, Lemma 3.1).
7.3. Exactly as the main result of Kukushkin (2011), our Theorem 1 is an extension of the theorem
of Bergstrom (1975) and Walker (1977) to strategic games. It even suggests a new generalization of
that old theorem: An acyclic binary relation B on a compact topological space X admits a maximizer
if, whenever y B x, there is an open neighborhood O of x and a nite set fz1; : : : ; zmg  X such that
for every x0 2 O there is k for which zk B x0. Funnily, this particular result seems to have never been
published although there are quite a few even more straightforward generalizations in the literature.
7.4. It is interesting to note that no consistency between topology and order is needed in Theorem 2
and Theorem 3, which fact contrasts with Kukushkin (2016, Section 3). Moreover, the topology on
each Xi need not even be Hausdor and the lattices need not be complete. On the other hand, we have
to assume the lattices Xi to be distributive in either theorem because we could not assert that  
00 is
nite otherwise. There may be weaker assumptions with the same implication, but, to my knowledge,
all lattices in economics models are distributive.
7.5. There is some supercial similarity between our Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 2 of Prokopovych
and Yannelis (2017); however, that similarity should not be overestimated. Of the four principal as-
sumptions of the latter theorem, two are stronger than corresponding assumptions here: Xi's are chains
rather than lattices and the game has to be \better reply secure" (under a stronger, cardinal, inter-
pretation of the property) rather than have Q-nite deviation property. The assumption of \upward
or downward upper semicontinuity" has no counterpart here. Finally, the \approximate downward
(or upward) transfer single-crossing" assumption, which presumes cardinal utility functions, is simply
incomparable with our versions of the single crossing: it is not implied by (2) and does not imply (3).
Unlike our conditions (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), that last assumption need not be inherited by subgames;
therefore, a proof of Theorem 2 of Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) in the style of our Proposition 5.1
seems impossible. It remains unclear, without a further study, whether their assumptions imply the
very(-very) weak FIP.
7.6. The key role in the proof of Theorem 3 is played by a construction essentially invented by Jensen
(2010), who built on Huang (2002), Dubey et al. (2006), and Kukushkin (2005). Unfortunately, there
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were technical oversights in Jensen (2010): the proof needed stronger topological assumptions than
were made explicitly (Jensen, 2012). In a personal communication, Jensen conjectured that his main
theorem is nonetheless valid as stated. Our Theorem 3 makes a signicant step towards the vindication
of his position.
Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let xN 2 XN . Since   is better-reply secure, for every vN 2 G(xN ), there are j(vN ) 2 N ,
(vN ) 2 Cj(vN ), yj(vN ) 2 Xj(vN ), and V j(vN )(vN )  X j(vN ) such that V j(vN )(vN ) is open,
x j(vN ) 2 V j(vN )(vN ), (vN ) > vj(vN ), and, whenever x j(vN ) 2 V j(vN )(vN ), there holds
uj(vN )(yj(vN ); x j(vN ))  (vN ). Denoting W (vN ) := fwN 2 CN j (vN ) > wj(vN )g, we have
vN 2 W (vN ) and hence G(xN ) 
S
vN2 G(xN )W (vN ). Since every W (vN ) is open while
G(xN ) is
compact, there are v1N ; : : : ; v
m
N 2 G(xN ) such that G(xN ) 
Sm
h=1W (v
h
N ).
Whenever j(vkN ) = j(v
h
N ) and (v
k
N )  (vhN ), we have W (vkN )  W (vhN ) and hence W (vhN ) is not
needed to provide an open cover of G(xN ). Deleting such superuous subsets, we obtain a subset M 
N and, for each i 2M , a utility level i 2 Ci, a strategy yi 2 Xi, and an open neighborhood V i of x i
in X i such that ui(yi; x i)  i whenever x i 2 V i, and G(xN ) 
S
i2MfwN 2 CN j i > wig =: ~W .
Claim A.1. There is an open neighborhood V of xN such that uN (xN ) 2 ~W whenever xN 2 V .
Remark. In principle, this claim belongs to textbook material. Since our assumptions are broader
than usual, a complete proof is given.
Proof. We set F := (cluN (XN )) n ~W  CN ; F is compact. For every wN 2 F , we have (xN ; wN ) =2
G. Since G is closed, there is an open neighborhood V 0(wN ) of (xN ; wN ) in XN  CN such that
V 0(wN ) \ G = ;; without restricting generality, we have V 0(wN ) = V 0X(wN ) V 0C(wN ), where V 0X(wN )
is open in XN , while V
0
C(wN ) is open in CN . Since fxNgF is compact, it is covered by a nite number
of such neighborhoods: V 0(w1N ), . . . , V
0(wm0N ). We dene V :=
Tm0
h=1 V
0
X(w
h
N ); V is open and xN 2 V .
Now if xN 2 V and uN (xN ) =2 ~W , we would have uN (xN ) 2 F ; therefore, hxN ; uN (xN )i 2 V 0(whN )
for some h, and hence uN (xN ) 2 V 0C(whN ). Since xN 2 V 0X(whN ), we have hxN ; uN (xN )i 2 V 0(whN ) as
well. Therefore, hxN ; uN (xN )i =2 G, which is impossible.
Picking such an open neighborhood V , we dene O := V \ Ti2M [Xi  V i]. Again, O is open
and xN 2 O. Let us show that O is dominated by fhi; yiigi2M . Let xN 2 O; hence uN (xN ) 2 ~W by
Claim A.1 and hence i > ui(xN ) for some i 2M . Since x i 2 V i, we have ui(yi; x i)  i > ui(xN ),
i.e., (yi; x i) BIndi xN indeed.
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B Proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2
In addition to M(xN ) := Argmini xi dened in Section 4, we introduce these notations: m(xN ) :=
mini xi; m2(xN ) := supfp 2 R+ j #fi 2 N j xi < pg < 2g = inffp 2 R+ j #fi 2 N j xi  pg  2g;
M2(xN ) := fi 2 N j xi  m2(xN )g; plainly speaking, m2(xN ) is the second price from the bottom
(\Vickrey price"). Clearly, #M(xN ) > 1 () m(xN ) = m2(xN ) () M(xN ) =M2(xN ).
B.1 Acyclicity
As a rst, trivial observation, we notice that ui(xN )  0 for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN , and hence the
improving player must obtain a strictly positive prot. In particular, yi > ci and i 2M(yN ) whenever
yN BIndi xN .
Claim B.1.1. If yN BIndi xN and i 2M(xN ), then m2(yN ) = m2(xN ) and M2(yN ) =M2(xN ).
Proof. If M(xN ) = fig, then yi  m2(xN ) and hence both statements hold. If #M(xN ) > 1, then
yi < xi and hence m(yN ) < m(xN ) = m2(xN ) = m2(yN ) and M2(yN ) =M2(xN ).
Claim B.1.2. If yN BIndi xN and i =2 M(xN ), then either m2(yN ) < m2(xN ), or m2(yN ) = m2(xN )
and M2(yN ) M2(xN ).
Proof. We have yi  m(xN ) < xi. If #M(xN ) > 1, then m2(yN ) = m2(xN ) = m(xN ) and M2(yN ) =
M2(xN )[fig M2(xN ). IfM(xN ) = fjg, thenM2(yN ) = fi; jg and m2(yN ) = m(xN ) < m2(xN ).
Now suppose, to the contrary, that there is an improvement cycle, i.e., a sequence x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such
that m > 0, xmN = x
0
N , and x
k+1
N BIndi(k) xkN for each k = 0; 1; : : : ;m  1. Clearly, i(k) cannot be the same
for all k; moreover, we may, without restricting generality, assume i(k+1) 6= i(k) for all k. Claims B.1.1
and B.1.2 imply that m2(x
k
N ) = p
0 and M2(x
k
N ) =M
0 for all k = 0; 1; : : : ;m. Claim B.1.2 implies that
i(k) 2M(xkN ) M0 for all k. Now a contradiction is obvious: If i(0) 2M(x0N ) and x1N BIndi(0) x0N , then
M(x1N ) = fi(0)g and hence we cannot have both i(1) 2M(x1N ) and i(1) 6= i(0).
Remark. Neither upper semicontinuity, nor monotonicity of D were needed in the proof.
B.2 Single deviation: Suciency
First of all, for every xN 2 XN and p 2 R+, we x and denote O(xN ; p) an open neighborhood of xN
where all strict inequalities between components xi, as well as between them and p, are preserved, i.e.,
whenever xi > xj (or xi > p or xi < p), there holds x
0
i > x
0
j (x
0
i > p, x
0
i < p) for all x
0
N 2 O(xN ; p).
Now let xN 2 XN . We consider several alternatives.
A. There is i 2 N n M(xN ) for which ci < m(xN ). Picking an arbitrary yi 2 ]ci;m(xN )[, we
immediately obtain ui(yi; x i) > 0 = ui(xN ) for every xN 2 O(xN ; yi). Therefore, xN =2 E( ) and
there is no problem with the R-single deviation property at this prole.
Henceforth, we assume A not to be the case, i.e., ci  m(xN ) whenever i =2 M(xN ). It follows
immediately that Argmini2N ci M(xN )
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B. M(xN ) = fig; then Argminj2N cj = fig as well and m2(xN )  c := minj 6=i cj  xi, with at least
one of the inequalities strict. We consider two alternatives.
B1. There is yi 2 [ci;m2(xN )] such that (yi   ci)  D(yi) > ui(xN ). Being upper semicontinuous
and decreasing, D is left continuous. Therefore, we may pick yi < m2(xN ) such that ui(yi; x i) =
(yi   ci)  D(yi) > ui(xN ); moreover, (yi   ci)  D(yi) > (xi   ci)  D(xi) for all xN from an open
neighborhood O of xN . Thus, xN =2 E( ), fhi; yiig dominates O \ O(xN ; yi), and hence there is no
problem with the R-single deviation property at this prole.
B2. ui(yi; x i)  ui(xN ) for all yi 2 [ci;m2(xN )]; in other words, xi 2 Argmaxxi2[ci;m2(xN )](xi  
ci) D(xi). Then, obviously, xN 2 E( ); therefore, nothing is required even for the R-single deviation
property.
C. #M(xN ) > 1. We partition M(xN ) into M
0 [M+, where M0 := fi 2M(xN ) j ci = m(xN ) [=
xi]g and M+ := fi 2M(xN ) j ci < m(xN ) [= xi]g, and consider three alternatives.
C1. M+ = ;; then m(xN ) = mini2N ci and xN 2 E( ); again, nothing is required even for the
R-single deviation property.
C2. #M+ > 1. We x an i 2 M+. Since D is left continuous (see B1), there is yi < xi and an
open neighborhood O0 of xN such that (yi   ci) D(yi) > (xi   ci) D(xi)=(#M+) for all xN 2 O0. In
particular, xN =2 E( ). We set c^ := maxj2M+ cj [< m(xN )] and pick p 2]maxfyi; c^g;m(xN )[. Let us
show that fhi; yiig [ fhj; pigj2M+nfig dominates O := O0 \O(xN ; p).
Let xN 2 O; then M(xN )  M(xN ) since xN 2 O(xN ; yi). If i =2 M(xN ), then ui(xN ) = 0 while
ui(yi; x i) > 0 since xN 2 O(xN ; yi); hence (yi; x i) BIndi xN . If there is j 2 M+ n M(xN ) such
that j 6= i, then uj(xN ) = 0 and, dening yN by yj := p, y j := x j , we obtain yN BIndi xN since
xN 2 O(xN ; yi). Finally, if M+  M(xN ), then ui(xN ) = (xi   ci)  D(xi)=#M(xN )  (xi   ci) 
D(xi)=#M
+ < (yi   ci)  D(yi) since xN 2 O0; therefore, (yi; x i) BIndi xN again. Thus, there is no
problem with the R-single deviation property at this prole.
C3. M+ = fig. Similarly to the case B above, we have Argminj2N cj = fig as well and
xi = m(xN ) = m2(xN ) = c := minj 6=i cj . Since D is left continuous, xN =2 E( ). We consider
two alternatives.
C3a. Let (1a) hold. Picking yi 2 Argmaxxi2[ci;c](xi ci)D(xi), we have yi < xi and (yi ci)D(yi) >
(xi   ci) D(xi). Since D is upper semicontinuous, we have (yi   ci) D(yi) > (xi   ci) D(xi) for all
xN from an open neighborhood O of xN . Thus, fhi; yiig dominates O \O(xN ; yi), and hence there is
no problem with the R-single deviation property at this prole.
C3b. Let (1a) fail, i.e., c 2 Argmaxxi2[ci;c](xi   ci) D(xi). We consider further alternatives.
C3bI. Let both (1b) and (1e) hold. Denoting V +i := maxxi2[ci;c](xi  ci) D(xi), we, invoking (1b),
pick c > c such that (xi   ci)  D(xi) < V +i for every xi 2 ]c; c], and, invoking (1e), pick yi 2 [ci; c[
for which (yi   ci) D(yi) = V +i . Now we dene O := O(xN ; c) \ O(xN ; yi) and show that fhi; yiig
dominates O n E( ).
Indeed, let xN 2 O. First, we have ui(yi; x i) = V +i . If ui(xN ) < V +i , then we are home. If
ui(xN ) = V
+
i , then xi  c and hence xN 2 E( ). Thus, there is no problem with the P-single deviation
property at this prole.
C3bII. Let (1c) hold. Then we pick c > c for which c 2 Argmaxxi2[ci;c](xi   ci)  D(xi). Now
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every xN such that xi = xi = c and xj 2 ]c; c] for all j 2 M+ n fig is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
xN 2 cl E( ) and nothing is required of it if we want to establish the Q-simple deviation property.
C3bIII. Let (1d) hold. For every " > 0, we pick x"i 2 [c  "; c[ \ Argmaxxi2[ci;c](xi   ci)  D(xi)
and dene x"N := (x
"
i ; x i). Clearly, x
"
N 2 E( ) for every " > 0, and hence xN 2 cl E( ) with the same
implications as in the case C3bII.
Let us summarize our ndings. If #Argmini2N ci > 1, then every xN 2 XN belongs to one of
the cases A, C1, or C2; in each of them, the R-simple deviation property has been established. Let
Argminj2N cj = fig. If (1a) holds, then, additionally, the cases B1, B2, and C3a become possible,
in which, again, the R-simple deviation property has been established. If (1a) fails, but (1b) and (1e)
hold, then C3a is replaced in the list with C3bI and we have the P-simple deviation property. Finally,
if (1a) fails, but (1c) or (1d) holds, then C3a is replaced with C3bII or C3bIII, and in either case
we have the Q-simple deviation property.
B.3 Necessity
Let Argminj2N cj = fig, and let (1a) fail, i.e., c 2 Argmaxxi2[ci;c](xi   ci) D(xi). We dene xN 2 XN
by xi := c and xj := cj for all j 6= i. In the taxonomy of Section B.2, this prole belongs to the case
C3; hence, xN =2 E( ). Let O  XN be an open neighborhood of xN and Z be a nite set of pairs
hj; yji (j 2 N , yj 2 Xj). For each j 2 N , we denote Yj := fyj 2 Xj j hj; yji 2 Zg. Then we set
Y + := (]c;+1[ \Sj2N Yj) and p+ := minY + [> c].
Claim B.3.1. O is not dominated with Z.
Proof. The open neighborhood O \ O(xN ; p+) of xN (with O(xN ; p+) dened in the beginning of
Section B.2) contains xN for which xi = c and xj > c for all j 6= i. Whenever j 6= i and yj 2 Yj , we have
m(yj ; x j) = c and hence uj(yj ; x j) = 0 = uj(xN ). If yi 2 Yi and yi > c, then m(yi; x i) < p+  yi
and hence ui(yi; x i) = 0 < ui(xN ). Finally, if yi 2 Yi and yi < c, then we have ui(xN ) = (c ci)D(c) 
(yi   ci) D(yi) = ui(yi; x i), the inequality in the middle following from the negation of (1a).
Thus, there is no R-nite deviation property without (1a).
Claim B.3.2. Let p 2 R+ be such that p > ci and (p ci) D(p) > (p ci) D(p) for all p 2 [p ; p[ (with
ci  p  < p). Then for every p 2 [p ; p[ and p0 2 ]p; p[, there is p00 2 ]p0; p[ such that (p00  ci) D(p00) >
(p  ci) D(p).
A straightforward proof, based on the left continuity of D, is omitted.
Claim B.3.3. If either (1b) or (1e) does not hold, then O n E( ) is not dominated with Z.
Proof. Let (1b) fail; then O \ O(xN ; p+) contains xN such that c < xi < xj for all j 6= i and
(xi   ci) D(xi)  (c  ci) D(c). We have uj(yj ; x j)  uj(xN ) for all hj; yji 2 Z for the same reason
as in the proof of Claim B.3.1 Meanwhile, xN =2 E( ) because this prole belongs to the case A or C2
in the taxonomy of Section B.2.
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Let (1e) fail; then Claim B.3.2 is applicable to p := c. Therefore, xN =2 E( ) whenever xi < c.
Moreover, by the same claim, we can pick xi in such a way that xN := (xi; x i) 2 O \ O(xN ; p+)
while (xi   ci)  D(xi) > (yi   ci)  D(yi) for all yi 2 Yi \ [ci; c[. Again, uj(yj ; x j)  uj(xN ) for all
hj; yji 2 Z.
Thus, there is no P-nite deviation property without (1b) and (1e).
Claim B.3.4. If neither (1c) nor (1d) holds, then xN =2 cl E( ).
Proof. The negation of (1d) implies the existence of p  2 [ci; c[ such that Claim B.3.2 is applicable to
p := c and p . Let us show that O(xN ; p ) \ E( ) = ;.
Let xN 2 O(xN ; p ). If m(xN ) < c, and hence M(xN ) = fig, then Claim B.3.2 immediately
implies that xN =2 E( ). If m(xN ) > c, then this prole belongs to the case A or C2 in the taxonomy
of Section B.2; hence xN =2 E( ) again. If m(xN ) = c and i =2 M(xN ) or #M(xN ) > 1, then xN
belongs to the case A or C3 with the same implication. Finally, if m(xN ) = c and M(xN ) = fig, then
xN belongs to the case B1 since (1c) does not hold.
Taking into account Claim B.3.1, we see that there is no Q-nite deviation property without (1c)
or (1d).
Claim B.3.5. Let condition (1e) not hold, let x0N 2 XN be such that x0i < c and x0j = c for at least one
j 6= i, and let Y  XN denote the set of strategy proles yN for which there exists an improvement path
starting at x0N and ending at yN . Then there is an open neighborhood O of E( ) such that Y \O = ;.
Proof. Obviously, only player i is capable of improvements at x0N . The negation of (1e) means that
(c   ci)  D(c) > (xi   ci)  D(xi) for every xi < c, and hence Claim B.3.2 applies with p := c. A
straightforward inductive argument shows that, at every yN 2 Y , the inequality yi  c holds and only
player i is capable of improvements. Therefore, Y \ E( ) = ;. Denoting O := fxN 2 XN j xi > cg, we
immediately see that O is open, E( )  O, and Y \O = ;; actually, even clY \O = ;.
Thus, there is no very weak FIP property without (1e).
Claim B.3.6. If none of conditions (1) holds, then E( ) = ;.
Proof. Let xN 2 XN . If m(xN ) < c, then M(xN ) = fig and xN =2 E( ) as shown in the proof of
Claim B.3.5. If m(xN ) < c, then xN =2 E( ) as shown in the proof of Claim B.3.4 (the assumption
xN 2 O(xN ; p ) was not needed in that part of the proof).
B.4 Very weak FIP: Suciency
Let Argminj2N cj = fig, and let condition (1e) hold. If (1b) also holds, then   has the P-single
deviation property and hence the very weak FIP as well; so let (1b) fail, and hence (1a) fail too. We
want to show that the set E( ) can be approached starting from any x0N 2 XN . If x0N 2 E( ), we
are home immediately. For every xN 2 XN , we denote m i(xN ) := minj 6=i xj [ c]. Then we pick
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x+i 2 [ci; c[ \Argmaxxi2[ci;c]
 
(xi   ci) D(xi)

, which is possible because of (1e), and set Y 0 := fxN 2
XN j c < xi < m i(xN )g. Every xN 2 Y 0 belongs to the case A in the taxonomy of Section B.2; hence
Y 0 \ E( ) = ;.
Claim B.4.1. For every xN 2 XN n (Y 0 [ E( )), there is yN 2 Y 0 [ E( ) such that yN BIndi xN .
Proof. We note rst that m i(xN )  c in any case. Then we consider four alternatives. (i) Let
m i(xN ) = c. We dene yN := (x+i ; x i); obviously, yN 2 E( ). Since xN =2 E( ), we have yN BIndi xN .
(ii) Let c < m i(xN ) < xi. Then xN belongs to the case A in the taxonomy of Section B.2; picking
yi 2 ]c;m i(xN )[ and setting yN := (yi; x i), we obtain yN 2 Y 0 such that yN BIndi xN . (iii) Let
c < m i(xN ) = xi. Then xN belongs to the case C2 in the same taxonomy, and we are home picking
yi 2 ]c; xi[ close enough to xi. (iv) Let xi  c < m i(xN ). The negation of (1b) ensures that we can
pick yi 2 ]c;m i(xN )[ for which (yi; x i) BIndi xN ; obviously, (yi; x i) 2 Y 0.
We pick j 6= i for which cj = c and dene xN by xi := x+i , xj := c and x ij := x0 ij ; obviously,
xN 2 E( ). Now let x0N 2 Y 0. We dene an innite improvement path hxkN ik2N by x2k+1i := x2ki ,
x2k+2i := (c + x
2k+1
j )=2, x
2k+1
j := (c + x
2k
i )=2, and x
2k+2
j := x
2k+1
j . Clearly, the path converges to x
!
N
where x!i = x
!
j = c and x
!
 ij = x
0
 ij . For every " > 0, there is k 2 N such that 0 < x2k+1j   c < ".
Replacing x2k+1i with x
+
i , player i makes an improvement and obtains a strategy prole whose distance
to xN is less than ". (That prole need not be an equilibrium!)
C Proof of Theorem 2
In light of Proposition 3.4, it is enough to show that   has the quasi weak FIP.
Let  0    be nite; for each i 2 N , we dene X 00i as the minimal sublattice of Xi containing X 0i.
Since Xi is distributive, X
00
i is still nite. The subsets X
00
i dene a subgame  
00   , which inherits
conditions (2a) and (5a) from  .
Now we can argue similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 of Kukushkin et al. (2005). We dene
X" := fxN 2 X 00N j 9yN 2 X 00N [yN > xN & yN BInd xN ]g; X# := X 00N nX";
yN  xN 


[yN 2 X# & xN 2 X"] or [xN ; yN 2 X" & yN > xN ] or
[xN ; yN 2 X# & yN < xN ]

: (10)
Clearly,  is irreexive and transitive.
Claim C.1. If xN 2 X 00N n E( 00), then there exists yN 2 X 00N such that yN BInd xN and yN  xN .
Proof. If xN 2 X", then we pick yN 2 X 00N such that yN BInd xN and yN > xN . If yN 2 X#, then
yN  xN by the rst disjunctive term in (10). If yN 2 X", then yN  xN by the second disjunctive
term in (10).
Let xN 2 X#. We pick i 2 N and yN 2 X 00N such that yN BIndi xN . Denoting Yi := fzi 2 X 00i j zi 
xig, we pick zi 2 Argmaxzi2Yi ui(zi; x i), which is possible because Yi is nite. Since xN 2 X#, yi > xi
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is impossible. If yi < xi, then ui(zi; x i)  ui(yi; x i); hence ui(zi; x i) > ui(xN ) and hence zi < xi.
If yi and xi are incomparable in the order, then yi _ xi > xi and yi ^ xi < xi. An assumption that
ui(xN )  ui(yi ^ xi; x i) would imply ui(yi; x i) > ui(yi ^ xi; x i), and hence ui(yi _ xi; x i) > ui(xN )
by (5a), contradicting our assumption that xN 2 X#. Therefore, ui(yi ^ xi; x i) > ui(xN ); hence
ui(zi; x i) > ui(xN ) and zi < xi again. Denoting zN := (zi; x i), we see that zN BInd xN and zN < xN .
To show that zN  xN , we only have to show that zN 2 X#.
Suppose the contrary: there are j 2 N and yj > zj such that
uj(yj ; z j) > uj(zN ): (11)
Let us consider two alternatives.
If j = i (hence z j = x i), yi > xi would contradict xN 2 X# while yi < xi would contradict the
choice of zi; therefore, we have to assume that yi and xi are incomparable, hence yi _ xi > xi. The
choice of zi implies ui(zi; x i)  ui(yi ^ xi; x i) and hence, by (11) and (5a), ui(yi _ xi; x i) > ui(xN ),
contradicting the assumption xN 2 X#.
Thus, we are led to j 6= i; hence yj > zj = xj and z j < x j . Now (11) and (2a) imply
uj(yj ; x j) > uj(xN ), again contradicting the assumption xN 2 X#.
Finally, having x0N 2 X 00N n E( 00), we start building an improvement path, applying Claim C.1 at
each step, i.e., picking xk+1N 2 X 00N such that xk+1N BInd xkN and xk+1N  xkN , as long as xkN =2 E( 00).
Since  is an order, we cannot return back. Since X 00N is nite, we reach E( 00) at some stage.
D Proof of Proposition 5.1
Supposing the contrary, we may apply Proposition 3.3 to the whole XN and obtain a nite set Z of
pairs hi 2 N; yi 2 Xii such that for every xN 2 XN there holds (yi; x i) BIndi xN for (at least) one
hi; yii 2 Z. Then we argue similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.4. Fixing an arbitrary x0N 2 XN ,
we, for each i 2 N , dene X 0i as fx0i g [ fyi j hi; yii 2 Zg  Xi and X 00i as the minimal sublattice of
Xi containing X
0
i. Then X
00
i is still nite. The subsets X
00
i dene a subgame  
00   , which inherits
appropriate conditions (2), (3), (5), or (6) from  .
For each i 2 N , we dene the best response correspondence:
Ri(x i) := Argmax
xi2X00i
ui(xi; x i):
Since X 00i is nite, Ri(x i) 6= ; for each x i 2 X 00 i. By Proposition 28 from Kukushkin (2013b) in the
case of i 2 N1, or by Proposition 26 from the same paper in the case of i 2 N2, the correspondence Ri
is weakly ascending in the sense of Veinott (1989):
[x0 i > x i & yi 2 Ri(x0 i) & xi 2 Ri(x i)]) [yi _ xi 2 Ri(x0 i) or yi ^ xi 2 Ri(x i)]:
Therefore, by Theorem 3.2 of Veinott (1989), or, easier to nd, Proposition 2.5 from Kukushkin (2013a),
there exists an increasing selection ri from Ri. Applying Tarski's xed point theorem to the Cartesian
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product of ri's, we obtain that E( 
00) 6= ;. On the other hand, the choice of X 0i ensures that, for every
xN 2 X 00N , there is yN 2 X 00N such that yN BInd xN , i.e., E( 00) = ;. The contradiction proves that
E( ) 6= ;.
E Proof of Theorem 3
In light of Proposition 3.4, it is enough to show that   has the quasi weak FIP. Let  0    be nite.
Exactly as in the case of Theorem 2, we dene X 00i , for each i 2 N , as the minimal sublattice of Xi
containing X 0i. Then X
00
i is still nite.
To establish that  00 has the weak FIP, we argue similarly to Jensen (2010) or rather Kukushkin
(2016). For each i 2 N , we dene the best response correspondence:
Ri(si) := Argmax
xi2X00i
Ui(si; xi):
Since X 00i is nite, Ri(si) 6= ; for each si 2 S00i .
Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5.1, Propositions 26 and 28 from Kukushkin (2013b) plus
Theorem 3.2 of Veinott (1989) or Proposition 2.5 from Kukushkin (2013a) imply the existence of
an increasing selection ri from Ri. Henceforth, we x such a selection for each i 2 N and denote
X0i := ri(S
0
i). Clearly, X
0
i  X 00i is a chain.
Now, we introduce this admissible best response improvement relation BBR on X 00N (i 2 N , yN ; xN 2
X 00N ):
yN BBRi xN 
 [yN BIndi xN & yi = ri(x i)];
yN BBR xN 
 9i 2 N [yN BBRi xN ]:
Since ri(x i) is dened for every x i 2 X 00 i, every maximizer of BBR on X 00N is a Nash equilibrium
in  00. Since X 00N is nite, it is sucient to show that BBR is acyclic. We achieve this objective by
producing an order potential of BBR, i.e., an irreexive and transitive binary relation  on X 00N such
that
8xN ; yN 2 X 00N

yN BBR xN ) yN  xN

:
For each i 2 N , we, henceforth, assume that S0i := i(X 00 i) = fs0i ; s1i ; : : : ; smi g (m may depend on
i, naturally) with ski > s
h
i whenever k > h. For each xi 2 X0i , we dene {i(xi) := minfk j xi = ri(ski )g
and
i(xi) :=  Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi) +
X
k<{i(xi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]: (12)
For xi 2 X 00i nX0i , we dene i(xi) arbitrarily, e.g., i(xi) := 0. For every xN 2 X 00N , we dene a set
N0(xN ) := fi 2 N j xi 2 X0i g and a function
H(xN ) := g(xN ) +
X
i2N
i(xi): (13)
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Now, we are ready to dene our potential, a binary relation on X 00N :
yN  xN 


N0(yN )  N0(xN ) or [N0(yN ) = N0(xN ) & H(yN ) > H(xN )] or
[N0(yN ) = N
0(xN ) & H(yN ) = H(xN ) & yN > xN ]

: (14)
Obviously,  is irreexive and transitive.
Claim E.1. If xN ; yN 2 X 00N and yN BBR xN , then yN  xN .
Proof. Let yN BBRi xN and i(x i) = s
k
i . We have yi = ri(s
k
i ) 6= xi by denition; hence yi 2 X0i and
N0(yN )  N0(xN ). If the inclusion is strict, we have yN  xN by the rst term in (14).
Let us assume N0(yN ) = N
0(xN ), i.e., xi 2 X0i . Taking into account (12), we can rewrite (13) as
H(xN ) =
X
k<{i(xi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))] + Fi(ski ; xi)  Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi) + C(x i); (15a)
H(yN ) =
X
k<{i(yi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))] + Fi(ski ; yi)  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; yi) + C(x i): (15b)
Let us assume that xi > yi; then {i(yi)  k < {i(xi). Subtracting (15a) from (15b), we obtain
H(yN ) H(xN ) = [Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi)  Fi(s
k
i ; xi)] 
X
kk<{i(xi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]
=
X
kk<{i(xi)

[Fi(s
k+1
i ; xi)  Fi(ski ; xi)]  [Fi(sk+1i ; ri(ski ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]

:
By (9), the dierence is strictly positive. Therefore, yN  xN by the second term in (14).
Now let us assume that xi < yi; then {i(xi) < {i(yi)  k. Subtracting (15a) from (15b), we obtain
H(yN ) H(xN ) =X
{i(xi)k<{i(yi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i )) Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))] + [Fi(ski ; yi)] Fi(s{i(yi)i ; yi)  [Fi(s
k
i ; xi) Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi)]
=
X
{i(xi)k<{i(yi)

[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]  [Fi(sk+1i ; xi)  Fi(ski ; xi)]

+

[Fi(s
k
i ; yi)  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; yi)]  [Fi(s
k
i ; xi)  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; xi)]

:
By (9), the dierence is non-negative; it can only be zero if {i(yi) = k = {i(xi) + 1. Thus, yN  xN
by the second or the third term in (14).
To summarize, we established that the admissible best response improvement relation BBR is acyclic
on X 00N . Starting from x
0
N 2 X 00N an admissible best response improvement path in  00, we inevitably
reach a Nash equilibrium at some stage. Therefore,  00 has the weak FIP.
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